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1 Introduction
	The pronoun ‘I’ refers to myself from the first-person perspective and a person (me) from the third person perspective. Essentially there is something common between the two perspectives taken: ‘I’ from the first person perspective refers to ‘self’; from the third person perspective refers to a ‘person’. Now ‘self’ and ‘person’ signify the same concept. ‘Self’ is a term used in context of first-person statements and ‘person’ is a term used in third person contexts. Both the terms refer to the same concept but from different perspectives. Consequently the terms ‘no-person’ and ‘no-self’ will be taken as synonymous in this article.  The use of ‘I’ signifies one more thing – that there exists a ‘self’ or ‘person’ that exists through time, in other words, it signifies ‘self-identity’ or ‘personal identity’. The aim of this article is to analyze the notion of ‘self’ or ‘person’ as denoted in the usage of the pronoun ‘I’. This article would examine ‘I’ as a fictitious entity in the background of the two historical theories of personal identity – David Hume’s theory and the Buddhist theory.
2 Reductionistic and Eliminative Theories of Personal Identity
Some more clarification remains pending before we commence with the exploration of this aspect of personal identity. This article does not seek a criterion or criteria of personal identity simply because the claim is that there are none, for personal identity is a myth. Personal identity is a long continuing and wide spread, seemingly obvious yet a fantastic myth among people in general and philosophers in particular.  The clarification that needs to be made here is the difference between reductionistic theories about personal identity and the no-person or no-self theories. Reductionistic theories of personal identity tend to reduce personal identity to continuity relations among some entities, whereas the no-person theories debunk any claim of personal identity. What is common between the reductionistic theories of the self and the no-self theories is that both of them deny the notion of an unchanging and constant ‘self’. This commonality between the two theories tends to put them in the same bracket in contrast to the theories of the unchanging self. Being bracketed together, these theories have frequently been confused as belonging to the same camp and more emphasis has been put on the reductionistic theories than the no-self theories. The crucial difference between the reductionistic theories and the no-self theories is: after the two theories demolish the notion of the unchanging self, the reductionistic theories go on to resurrect the notion of self in terms of continuity of some or the other criteriona; on the contrary, the no-self theories stick to the denial of any notion of self and personal identity and thereby logically and fundamentally debunking any project exploring the criteria of personal identity. The no-self theories are eliminative rather than reductive theories of personal identity.
Sequentially: First, theories of the unchanging self explain personal identity in terms of a metaphysical self or soul. Second, continuity theories of self reject the notion of a concrete and unchanging self or soul and cite continuity of certain entities such as memory, brain states as explaining personal identity. Third, the very notion of self is regarded as fictitious, that is, ‘no-person’ or ‘no-self’ theory. The ‘no-person’ theory logically deflates both: the notion of ‘personal identity’ and ‘person’. David Hume was the first Western philosopher to give a radical theory of personal identity – the no-self theory. In the following section we briefly state and analyze Hume’s no-self theory.
3(a) David Hume’s No-Self Theory
Hume discusses the problem of personal identity at two places of his seminal work A Treatise of Human Nature: First, in the main body of the Treatise in section 6 of Part IV of Book 1, and second, in an appendix published a year later with Book 3. Ironically, in the appendix Hume declares his dissatisfaction with his writing on personal identity in the Treatise, so much so that Hume confesses that he finds the whole matter a ‘labyrinth’ and he knows neither how to correct his former opinions nor how to render them consistent. It might also be noted that there is no discussion on personal identity in Hume’s other work: Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. However, let us first explicate Hume’s theory about personal identity. 
In outline, Hume asked himself ‘whether in pronouncing concerning the identity of a  person, we observe some real bond among his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we form of them’ (A Treatise of Human Nature 259). The question that Hume wants to raise here is very pertinent and extremely easy to miss: This inner feeling of unity or self-identity that we claim to have – is it a result of some concrete impression of a ‘real’ bond among our impressions or ideas? It is a fact that we have various ideas or impressions of perceptions, but do we have an idea of a bond among these perceptions? Do we have a corresponding idea of any unity among the various perceptions or ideas that one has? This is a subtle yet crucial question, for this unity is frequently assumed without introspection. But on introspection, do we actually perceive any unity or is the unity ‘feigned’ or constructed by our imagination? Hume questions the philosophers who claim that they are intimately conscious of what is called the ‘self’ – do they really constantly perceive their ‘self’, and if they do, then Hume ridicules them as being of a different constitution then his kind. It is clear that we do not have an idea of ‘self’ corresponding to any entity. It is to be noted that Hume here strictly follows the empiricist principle that all real ideas are derived from ‘some one impression’; Hume further claims that the ‘self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference’, and concludes that the question ‘From what impression is the idea of self derived?’ cannot be answered ‘without a manifest contradiction and absurdity’ (A Treatise of Human Nature 251). Granted that there is no impression of the self, Hume gives a concession by asking that may be the notion of the self has evolved from any impression that continued invariably throughout the whole course of our lives – for if there is such an impression then it would justify the claim for personal identity despite having no direct perception of the self. Again, the second question is answered in the negative: there is also no impression at all which is constant and invariable throughout our lives. So, one, neither do we have an impression of the ‘self’, and, two, nor do we have any impression at all which is constant and invariable throughout our lives. These two premises conclude that we have no real (that is, impression derived) idea of the self. Then what comes to be the reason for this prevalent ‘myth’ of personal identity? Hume analyzes that though perceptions have distinct existences and the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences and yet we have a strong intuitive feeling of being identical over time – the cause for such an intuitive feeling of personal identity is the construction of the mind. Hume claims that just as we continuously perceive passions and sensations – and this is misunderstood as the internal sense of unity. 
Hume’s claim is that in contemplating an identical, that is, an invariable and unchanging object, we are doing something very different from contemplating a succession of objects related by links of resemblance, causation and contiguity. According to Hume, the resemblance in perception of objects over a period of time is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of related objects; our propensity to confuse resemblance with identity stands so great that we give into it before we are aware of it (A Treatise of Human Nature 251). Flip books are an example of Hume’s theory and so are motion pictures – both animated and non-animated. Any motion picture, like a flip book, consists of a series of pictures which are run at such a speed that the human eye is not able to distinguish between two images and reads motion in the quick transition between the images. Hume’s point is that just as motion is imposed by the human cognitive system onto the running reel or images in a motion picture or a flip book, so does the human imagination imposes a sense of self-identity onto oneself. There is nothing ‘simple’ or ‘indivisible’ about self-identity; in fact, all human kind is just a bundle of perceptions with no material or immaterial ‘self’ tying the bundle together. Thus, the identity that we ascribe onto the mind of man is only a fictitious one, and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies (A Treatise of Human Nature 259). So far, Hume’s theory seems to be empirically sound, but such a radical nihilistic theory of personal identity has to tackle the issue of memory, for certain perceptions are remembered and there seem to be distinct chains of memory. Hume does talk about memory and his theory about memory is as follows. 
Hume poses the copy theory of memory wherein memory is regarded as a faculty which ‘raises’ the images of past perceptions – the copy of perceptions are stored as memories. Thus memory does not only provide an access to the past selves, but also forms the bundles of perceptions which we can survey, and this ability to survey a series of resembling and continuous memory images strengthens our propensity to believe in the fiction of a continuing self. Hume shares the approach of Locke regarding memory in holding that ‘memory not only discovers the identity but contributes to its production’ (A Treatise of Human Nature 261). Further, Hume rightly raises the issue of forgetting – we do not remember all our experiences, in fact often memories of several incidents (long past and intermittent) are forgotten and yet we feel the continuity of the same self. These forgotten incidents of long past along with intermittent forgetting should strictly infer a fractured personal identity, but this is not the case. The large gaps in memory of events makes Hume infer that memory does not offer a complete reason for the illusion of personal identity.  It ought to be some other stronger reason for creating the illusion of personal identity, Hume analyses it to be causality. Of the three relations as cited by Hume between perceptions: resemblance, contiguity and causality, Hume ascribes causality the most important relation in constructing self-identity. Contiguity is dropped as a possibility by Hume for according to him, it has little or no influence in the formation of the illusion of the self. Hume would not have undermined resemblance as a potent factor if there would be no loss of memory. As to causation, Hume argues that the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other (A Treatise of Human Nature 261). Causality appears to link impressions to ideas and so on – a chain of continuity is created irrespective of deletion of memories and it is this very apparent cause linking effect that is the single most influential factor in building the notion of the self. This briefly sums up Hume’s analysis of the ‘self’. Now let us proceed to see how tenable Hume’s theory is.
3(b) What is wrong with the Humean analysis of the ‘Self’?
	 Now despite the apparently empirically valid explanation of the fiction of the ‘self’, the theory is riddled with problems. First, Hume tends to stretch empiricism to its extreme and excludes any other epistemic means – by ascribing independent existence to perceptions, Hume makes a grave error. Perceptions are not discreet unitary empirical entities – they are essentially associated with perceiving minds. Perceptions do not lie out there singled and temporally separated. Second, Hume makes the notion of identity too rigid. It is very much possible that identity is compatible with change – things change in some aspects, but if their essence remains the same, they are regarded as identical. True, that in case of some entities such as mathematical entities, identity is strict and complete identity, but in the case of most other entities, identity is not of the total entity. Identity of the essence of an entity is usually enough to cite the identity of that entity despite changes taking place in the non-essential parts of that entity. These two objections are fundamental to critiquing Hume’s enterprise, but there are other objections too.
That we are united selves was questioned by Hume despite our intuitive belief in our unity and identity over time. Hume has rightly questioned these presumptions, but what is it that makes us know that certain perceptions are ours and not others. If humankind is a bundle of perceptions, what is it that binds together a particular set of perceptions as a bundle or person? What about more complicated mental events: beliefs, desires and intentions – all of them presuppose a continuous mental life and cannot be accounted for in a random cluster of perceptions or ideas.  The Humean story requires that perceptions be pre-bundled, as it were, before the belief-producing mechanism he describes can operate. So Hume cannot after all reject the metaphysical-ontological question of what in fact distinguishes one mind from another and what in fact unifies the elements within a single mind. Another obvious limitation of Hume’s theory is the question that ‘we’ mistakenly presuppose the existence of unitary selves; but what exactly is this ‘we’? Whose belief about the self is mistaken? What is it that feigns the ‘self’? The Cartesian point holds that there has to be something that makes the mistake of constructing and believing the ‘self’. Hume’s theory shows clear evidences of internal inconsistency. Hume has raised some very pertinent observations which are most easy to miss but fail in its intention of eliminating personal identity. Hume himself admits the limitation of his theory in the appendix to his Treatise. Hume’s theory is accurate in its analysis but inaccurate in its conclusion. He is correct in finding no empirical ‘self’ but thereby eliminating the ‘self’ is unjustified. What is eliminated by Hume is the concrete metaphysical notion of an unchanging self. Hume’s views on the ‘self’ has been often compared with Buddhist notion of ‘self’ in that both being nihilistic about the self. I shall now try to show that the Buddhist analysis of self shares its analysis with the findings of Hume but concludes differently from Hume. The Buddhists arrive at a reductive theory of self in contrast to Hume’s eliminative theory of ‘self’. Let us now proceed to the Buddhist notion of self.
4 Buddhist Notion of ‘No-Self’ (The Anattā Doctrine)
An analysis of the Buddhists theories about the notion of self is an exhaustive task considering the various schools of Buddhism and the detailed debates regarding the notion of self – such analysis would overstretch the scope of this article. For the purpose of this article, we discuss the Buddhist notion of ‘no-self’ as recorded in the section titled ‘Aṣṭamakośasthānasambaddaḥ’​[1]​ of Vasubandhu’s work Abhidharmakosa. Vasubandhu was a Buddhist author in the 5th century AD. His work Abhidharmakosa is considered a monumental work on Buddhist philosophy and presents a summation of the important concepts of Buddhist philosophy, particularly the teachings of the Vaibhāṣika School.​[2]​ 
 Among the schools of Indian philosophy, the Buddhists have a heretic or a revolutionary position. In contrast to most other schools of Indian philosophy, the Buddhists have mostly​[3]​ denied the notion of the soul. Buddhism is one of the rarest religions which do not subscribe to the notion of the soul – which is almost a prerequisite for any religion. However, a note of caution needs to be sounded here: Counter intuitive theories such as the no-person theories including that of Buddhism have often been a critic’s delight – an uncharitable interpretation of the counter intuitive theory is followed by a vindictive and scathing demolition of the theory. The following analysis of the Buddhist notion of ‘self’ attempts not to fall prey to such temptations.
To begin with, one needs to situate Buddhism in the timeline of philosophy. Buddhism was preceded by the fully developed form of the Samkhya system of philosophy and Buddhism has frequently been seen as a reaction to the Samkhya philosophy. The Samkhya school of Indian philosophy is an orthodox school and its earliest work Sāŉkhyapravaċanasūtra dates back to 200 AD. The Samkhya system’s fundamental claim was that of ontological dualism of prakṛti and puruṣas or the individual souls. The whole cosmos was understood as coming into existence from prakṛti to serve the ends of an infinite number of an individual souls. The Samkhya system held that prakṛti is constituted by three ultimate elements or substances: sattva, rajas and tamas. They are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion respectively, sattva manifests an object to consciousness, rajas to activity and motion, and tamas to inertia and resistance (Sinha 260-1). In the Samkhya system the soul is given an independent and crucial ontological status. The Samkhya regards the soul as a simple, conscious and unchanging entity. The Samkhya further makes a distinction between the transcendental self (termed puruṣa) and the empirical self (termed jīva). Our concern here is the ontologically concrete nature of self which is interpreted to anticipate the reactive theory of self by the Buddha. It has been suggested that the Buddha systematically studied philosophy under two teachers of the Samkhya tradition (Stcherbatsky 2). Buddha’s teachers in all probability had already rejected the three primary constituents of matter​[4]​ and this rejection logically proceeds to the denial of the notion of the soul – which was the part of the Samkhya’s ontology.  The point to be noted that, as no theory can be judged independent of its time, so also the Buddhist theory of self was not independent of its time, instead it was a clear reaction and product of its times, the Samkhya philosophy in particular.
The Buddhists have denied the existence of Soul. The term ‘soul’ according to Buddhism is only a term of convention used for the sake of convenience to refer to a flux of elements or skandhas alone. The five skandhas are: physical elements, feelings, ideas, volitions and general consciousness. These are regarded as the five components or constituents of human beings. The ‘soul’ has been regarded as a Real entity over and above these skandhas and this is firmly denied by the Buddhists. A person is the aggregate of these five skandhas and there is nothing more to it. This is deduced from the fact that there neither is a direct perception nor an inference in favour of the existence of the soul (Stcherbatsky 11). 
It is essential here to state the classification of truths made by the Buddha: there are two truths – the conventional (samvṛti) and the ultimate (paramārtha), and there is no third.​[5]​ “Words (used by) mutual agreements are true because of Worldly convention; words of ultimate meaning are true because of the existence of elements.”​[6]​ “A statement is said to be true in the conventional sense if it conforms to common sense, that is, if it is in accordance with conventionally accepted linguistic and epistemic practices.” (Siderits  464). A common instance of such a conventional term is the ‘sunset’, now, this is term which is a reminiscent of the geocentric era wherein the sun was taken to set down and rise the next morning. However, this view was corrected long back but the word ‘sunset’ continues to be used because it still makes sense in the conventional framework. The sun does not actually set anywhere but its apparent setting is taken as a cue enough to give meaning to the term ‘sunset’. When I refer to a meeting at sunset, it is not taken to be meaningless but understood as a time period of the day. This is a conventional truth, but not an ultimate truth. Entities which are true in the conventional sense, that is, these entities are thought to exist owing to our use of the entity as a convenient designation, may be termed as conceptual fictions. Truth in the ultimate sense may be understood as claims that correspond to facts and do not presuppose any conceptual fictions. The meaningful usage of the term ‘sunset’ cannot be sought as justification to a claim that the sun actually sets and turns off. That is a truth in conventional sense does not mean its truth in the ultimate sense. Obviously there are many truths in the conventional sense which are not true in the ultimate sense. The notion of soul is such a case: it is used as a matter of convenience for denoting the five skandhas. The Buddhas (the enlightened ones) have two types of speech; conventional and ultimate. When a Buddha refers to a person or a self, it is only in the conventional sense and not the ultimate sense, that is, persons are conceptual fictions. Since persons are conceptual fictions, any claim of personal identity over time must be ultimately false. So when I claim that I am the same person that I was years or moments back, it is true only from conventional or linguistic sense, there is no ultimate truth in this claim of identity. Intuitively one tends to mistake this linguistic construct or conceptual fiction of self as an ultimate truth. Buddhism seeks to correct this belief.
We now proceed to the details of the argument of the Buddhists denial of self. The following are the Buddhist views on self as understood from the dialogues between the propounder of the reality of soul  Vātsiputrīya​[7]​ and the defender of the no-self claim Vasubandhu​[8]​ in an appendix​[9]​ attached to the last chapter of  Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa. At the outset a difference is demarcated between actual and nominal existence: entities that exist by themselves are termed as actual existents, and entities which represent a combination of actual existents are termed as nominal existents. If the soul were an actual existent, it would have had an essence of its own and must be over and above its constituent elements (the five skandhas). But it is seen that the soul has no essence of its own and is only constituted by the five skandhas. Thus the soul is a nominal existent. But then what is the relation between the constituent elements and the self? An interesting analogy is raised to explicate the relationship between the elements and the self: fire and its fuel. Now the fire is constituted by its fuel and does not have any existence over and above it fuel. There is no instance of fire without fuel, so there is no justification of granting an ultimate or ontological independent status to fire, so also, there is no justification of granting an ontologically independent status to the self. The Buddha analyses processes of cognition by citing the example of a visual perception: When an object, sense organ and consciousness combine, a sensation is produced, and this sensation is accompanied by a feeling, a representation and volition; thus we have four mental elements (feeling, representation or idea, volition or will, and consciousness) and one physical element (organ of sight – our visual perception system) and these elements combined are referred as a person, a soul, a human being or any such designation (Stcherbatsky 26). The Buddha has himself declared that one must hold to the definite (direct, technical) meaning of his words (Stcherbatsky 27). 





^1	  This section deals with the Buddhist denial of the existence of soul.
^2	  My primary reference has been to Theodore Stcherbatsky’s  The Soul Theory of the Buddhists.
^3	  An exception: The Pudgalavādins, a school of Buddhist philosophy has been interpreted as subscribing to the non-reductionist notion of self. 
^4	  Sattva, rajas and tamas as propounded by the Saŉkhya school.
^5	  From a translation by Steven Collins in Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1982 as quoted in Giles (186).
^6	  ibid.
^7	  The Vātsiputrīyas is a sect of Buddhism. The followers of Vātsiputrīya claimed that the person or self was real and it carries the bundle of  skandhas. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vatsiputriya)
^8	  Vasubandhu was also a Buddhist and is the author of the  Abhidharmakośa. He is a defender of the Buddhist no-soul theory.
^9	  The appendix is titled ‘Aṣṭamakośasthānasambaddaḥ pudgalaviniścayaḥ’. It deals with the Buddhist denial of the existence of the soul. Theodore Stcherbatsky’s translation of this appendix is used as the source material.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